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KYSOR INDUSTRIAL CORP. V FRAZIER:
STRICT LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO WARN
INTRODUCTION
In March 1982, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for
the plaintiff in a products liability action for personal injuries.' This deci-
sion halted a trend, favoring plaintiffs in failure to warn cases,2 which had
begun in 1975 when the Colorado Supreme Court adopted section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts .3
The opinion in Krsor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier4 is worthy of critical com-
ment for two reasons. First, the supreme court majority's interpretation of
the facts appears to have been made in disregard of competent evidence; and
second, the opinion is likely to be cited inappropriately as precedent for fail-
ure to warn products liability actions in Colorado.
This comment will provide a brief discussion of the rationale and his-
tory of strict liability for products, a review of Colorado case law on failure
to warn in products liability actions, and an analysis of the relevance of the
foreseeability of harm and of the plaintiff's conduct in such actions in light of
the Kysor decision.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
On February 16, 1976, Jack Frazier was severely injured while moving a
four-ton traverse plate saw,5 which was sixteen feet long and seven feet
high. 6 Frazier's employer, Duffy Moving & Storage Company (Duffy), had
been contacted by the distributor, Duboc-Lane and Moncton, Inc. (D.L.M.).
Duffy was to move the saw from the D.L.M. to the warehouse of Esco Corpo-
ration (Esco), the purchaser.7 Usually this large piece of equipment, manu-
factured by Kysor Industrial Corporation (Kysor), was shipped directly to
the purchaser. In this case, however, D.L.M. agreed to store the saw until
Esco completed the warehouse where it was to be housed.8
When the saw first arrived in Denver, a Duffy employee safely moved it
1. Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
2. The reported cases in strict liability for failure to warn, decided in Colorado between
1975 and the Kysor decision are: Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt &
Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 565
P.2d 217 (1977); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
3. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) (see tnfra note 37 for
full text) was expressly adopted in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983
(1975). In Hzigtl the court held that failure to provide an adequate warning may render a
product, otherwise free of defect, defective for purposes of § 402A.
4. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
5. Id. at 909.
6. Id. at 913 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
7. 642 P.2d at 909.
8. Id.
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into the D.L.M. warehouse using a hydrocrane. 9 Three weeks later, Frazier,
a foreman for Duffy, was sent to move the saw from D.L.M. to Esco's ware-
house.' 0 At the D.L.M. warehouse, Frazier was shown how to rig the saw in
order to lift it with the hydrocrane, which had been ordered for the opera-
tion. He then loaded the saw onto a truck.II Knowing that a forklift was
available at Esco for unloading, Frazier sent the hydrocrane back to Duffy's
yard; neither Kysor nor D.L.M. knew what equipment was to be used to
unload the saw at the Esco warehouse.'
2
As an experienced mover of heavy equipment, Frazier looked for lift
marks on the saw and attempted to determine the center of gravity in prepa-
ration for unloading the saw at Esco.' 3 Most of the surface area above the
saw's center of gravity was covered with sheet metal, which made the calcu-
lation difficult.' 4 There were no lift marks and no warnings or instructions
for moving the saw.1 5 Frazier slipped the forklift under the lowest horizontal
member of the saw, unloaded it from the trailer, and moved it into Esco's
warehouse.' 6 This maneuver was executed without incident; the saw was
put in position in the warehouse and Frazier prepared to remove its 600-700
pound skid plate.
17
Believing the saw had been lowered all the way to the ground, Frazier
directed his co-workers to remove the lag screws from the skid.' 8 He then
bent over to cut the steel bands which held the unassembled parts of the saw
to the skid. The saw in fact was slightly above the ground, and removal of
the skid caused the center of gravity to shift.' 9 The saw became unstable; it
rocked back and forth on the forklift and then turned over onto Frazier,
causing a severe hemorrhage in his back and a sprain in the cervical region
of his neck.
20
Justice Dubofsky noted evidence in her dissent which was not men-
tioned in the majority opinion.2' According to one expert witness, the center
of gravity was probably below the lift point while the skid was attached.
22
The skid could not have been removed, according to this expert, unless the
saw was slightly above ground, and the saw by itself could not have been
lifted in a stable manner with a forklift positioned under the lower beam.
23




12. Id. at 909-10.
13. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kysor Indus.
Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 642 P.2d at 910.
17. Id. The skid plate was a wooden apparatus with rollers, temporarily attached to the
base of the saw during shipment. Id. at 913 (Duboskfy, J., dissenting).
18. 642 P.2d at 910, 912.
19. Id. at 910.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 913-15 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 914.
23. Id.
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large uncrated machines to be accompanied with instructions or warnings
for hoisting, moving, slinging, or lifting.24 In the absence of instructions to
the contrary, the superintendent testified, he would have used a forklift to
move the saw, as the plaintiff had, since the saw appeared to be stable.25
In addition, the general foreman at Kysor's own plant testified that dur-
ing the manufacturing process the saw was moved around the plant by using
an overhead crane with chains attached to particular points on the saw, one
chain being used especially for steadying. 26 Based on his familiarity with the
saw, this witness further stated that the crane was the only proper way to lift
the saw.
2 7
Frazier sought relief against Kysor and D.L.M., alleging strict liability
in tort for failure to provide warnings or instructions for the proper lifting
and moving of the saw and removal of the skid. 28 The jury returned a ver-
dict for Frazier which was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals.
29
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari but reversed the decision,
declaring there was no factual basis for submitting the strict liability claim to
the jury.
30
II. STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS
A. Rationale and Lbmts
Strict liability originally emerged in response to societal concerns over
the changing relationship between the individual consumer and the manu-





28. 642 P.2d at 910. Frazier originally sought recovery on three theories: I) negligence,
2) breach of implied warranty, and 3) strict liability for failure to provide warnings for the
proper method of lifting and moving the saw and removing the skid plate. Frazier later with-
drew the negligence and breach of warranty claims. Id.
29. Frazier v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 287, 607 P.2d 1296 (1979), rev'd, 642 P.2d
908 (Colo. 1982). The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that: 1) there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to find a failure of adequate instruction thereby creating a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer; 2) plaintiffs expertise in moving heavy equipment
did not preclude the finding of a defectively dangerous product due to the lack of instructions
for safely and properly moving the saw; and 3) by placing a product which is unreasonably
dangerous without a warning into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer bears the risk of
liability to those who foreseeably may be injured along the path of delivery. Therefore, a pro-
fessional mover is a protected "consumer" within the meaning of section 402A. 43 Colo. App.
at 290-92, 607 P.2d at 1300-01.
30. 642 P.2d at 913. The majority held that since the product's dangerous condition was
created solely by Frazier's mishandling there was no duty to warn or instruct. Id. at 911-12. For
a discussion of the factual issues reported in the majority and minority opinions, see infra notes
137-49 and accompanying text.
31. See generally Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in Califoma, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9
(1966). Increased public awareness of the hazards associated with the manufacture and design
of products has spurred the growth of strict products liability. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 651
(4th ed. 1971). Imposition of liability on the manufacturer for harm caused by use of a defective
product has been justified by several arguments: a manufacturer is encouraged to produce safer
products if it believes it may be subject to liability for defective products; the loss can be borne
without hardship since the manufacturer can spread costs equally among consumers by adjust-
ing prices; the manufacturer is the entity that can easily obtain liability insurance, and this
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consumer who had suffered injury to his person or property from a product
was sometimes obtainable from a manufacturer or seller on theories of war-
ranty or negligence. 32 Serious obstacles to recovery existed with both ap-
proaches. An injured individual seeking relief under a contract-warranty
theory was often denied recovery because of disclaimer clauses or a lack of
privity of contract. 33 Recovery under a tort-negligence theory was limited
by the difficulty of proving the defendant failed to use reasonable care or
was somehow at fault in the manufacture or sale of the product. 34 The plain-
tiff in a strict liability action is in a better position to overcome the burdens
imposed by the increasing complexity of the manufacturing and distribu-
tional process;3 5 recovery is possible without proving the defendant's negli-
gence or the existence of a privity relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant.
3 6
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 7 provides that a manu-
facturer or supplier who allows a product to be distributed in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user" may be liable,
even to remote users, although "all possible care" has been used in the prep-
aration and sale of the product. 38 A product may be defective as marketed if
any of the following exists: a flaw in the product such as a manufacturing
abnormality which makes the product more dangerous than intended, 39 a
failure to warn or provide adequate instructions as where the product is in its
intended condition but is defective because of the failure to present it prop-
erly to users,4° or a defective design where the product is in its intended
condition but is not sufficiently safe.
4 1
expense can be built into production costs. See generally Keeton, Manufacturer's Ltabihty. The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 561
(1969); Keeton, Products Liabilt--Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293,
293-98 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Products Liability]; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
32. Keeton, Products Liability, supra note 31, at 295-96.
33. Id. at 296.
34. Id See also Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REX'.
551 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Design Defects]; Wade, supra note 31.
35. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975).
36. Wade, supra note 31, at 825.
37. Section 402A states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
38. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 256
(1969).
39. Products Liability, supra note 31, at 297.
40. Id. at 297-98; Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
41. Products Liability, supra note 31, at 298; Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
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Strict liability is not the equivalent of insurance; 42 otherwise, the manu-
facturer would be absolutely liable for any injury sustained by any person
however remotely connected with the product. Although the Restatement dis-
penses with requirements of privity and proof of negligence, a plaintiff in
most jurisdictions must still prove that the product was "unreasonably dan-
gerous" as well as defective. 43 A finding that the product was "unreasonably
dangerous" will likely be affected by consideration of negligence rules.
4 4
Appropriate limits both as to the original existence of liability and as to
its scope and extent are currently being defined. 45 Limits set by the courts in
terms of scope and extent have usually been controlled by the concepts of
proximate cause or risk, including abnormal use, and plaintiffs fault, includ-
ing contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse.4 6 On the other
hand, analysis of the nature of the product itself governs original existence of
liability; 4 7 actionability exists when there is something wrong with the prod-
uct that makes it dangerous. 48 It is then usually referred to as a defective
product. This adjective presents little problem when something has gone
wrong in the manufacturing process, and the product is not in its intended
condition.49 A cause of action, however, may also exist when a product has
been manufactured exactly as intended and the design is not sufficiently
safe, or warnings or adequate instructions are not provided. 50 The adjective
"defective" is then an expression for a legal conclusion rather than a test for
reaching that conclusion. 51 The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
anticipated potential problems in determining actionability. They decided
that by using terms which might appear redundant, "defective condition"
and "unreasonably dangerous," it would be clear that the product must
have something wrong with it, and that it must be harmful as a result.
52
B. Development of Current Law
The first test for strict liability in tort was articulated in 1962 by Justice
Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Products Co. 53 After the publication of the final
draft of the Restatement in 1965, jurisdiction after jurisdiction cited both sec-
42. Wade, supra note 31, at 828.
43. Noel, supra note 38, at 257. For discussion of the elimination of the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, see ifra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
44. Noel, supra note 38, at 257.
45. Wade, supra note 31, at 828.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 552.
52. Wade, supra note 31, at 830-33. Wade briefly discusses the "legislative history" of the
language of § 402A and alternatives to the term "unreasonably dangerous," and then presents a
seven-factor test as a standard for application. Id. at 830-38.
53. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Justice Traynor, writing for a
unanimous court, held that a plaintiff need only prove that while using a product as it was
intended to be used, he was injured because of a defect in design or manufacture of which he
was not aware and which made the product unsafe for its intended use. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at
910, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Two elements emerged as tests for recovery: defective in design or
manufacture and unsafe for intended use. Deszgn Defects, supra note 34, at 554.
1983]
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tion 402A and Greenman as authoritative legal bases for strict liability. 54 A
consensus was reached in the common law that the product must be unrea-
sonably dangerous to be actionable.
55
What appeared to be smooth development for strict liability in tort be-
came complicated by the intermingling of negligence concepts. In Cronin v.
JB.E Olson Corp.,56 the California Supreme Court re-examined its Greenman
opinion. The court concluded that a different test had been articulated in
Greenman than was expressed by the authors of the Restatement. 57 The "un-
reasonably dangerous" qualification, added to section 402A as a limiting
mechanism on liability for harm from a product with an inherently danger-
ous nature, was considered a step backward into the realms of negligence.
The court concluded that requiring proof that a defect in a product made it
"unreasonably dangerous" significantly burdened the plaintiff. Further-
more, the court feared this would lead to results in strict liability actions no
different from those reached under the laws of negligence. 58 The Cronin
court held that in order to recover in strict liability a plaintiff need only
show that the product was defective.59
The Cronbi decision is important because it demonstrates a concern that
strict liability has not been applied as a cause of action separate from negli-
gence concepts of unreasonableness or culpability. Cronin, however, has been
followed by only a few courts outside California 6° and has been criticized by
several commentators.6 1 It is argued that the term "defective", by itself, can
provide no real guidance in deciding a case involving an insufficiently safe
design or a failure to provide an adequate warning.62 Courts which have
54. Id. at 555. An informative history of the development of the final draft of § 402A is
presented in Wade, supra note 31, at 830-31, and Design Defects, supra note 34, at 554-55.
55. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 556.
56. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
57. Id. at 131-35, 501 P.2d at 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-43.
58. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
59. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
60. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213 (Alaska
1975); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601-03, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93-97, 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (1975).
61. See Keeton, froduct Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 30-31
(1973); Wade, supra note 31, 829-34.
62. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 557.
It is evident that the developing law in strict products liability remains in turmoil even in
California. In Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), the court recognized the inadequacy of the Cronin rule, which simply requires the prod-
uct to be shown defective in a design defect case. A new test was proposed which reflects a
substantial modification of the Cronin court's position; although in Barker, the court was careful
to retain the focus on the condition of the product as opposed to the conduct of the manufac-
turer. Under Barker a product is defective in design if: 1) the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or 2) the benefits of the design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the
design. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. A striking departure from the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement of the Restatement is not apparent except that, with re-
gard to the risk-benefit standard, the court held the burden of proof would shift to the defend-
ant once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the design proximately caused the
injury. See id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 446-47, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29, 237; Design Defects,
supra note 34, at 558.
A California Court of Appeals case construing Barker held that in a warning case, the jury
must be instructed that the standard is whether the "absence of an adequate warning renders
[Vol. 60:3
FAILURE TO WARN
considered the problem have adhered to the Restatement's "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, being unwilling to risk the consequences of unbur-
dening the plaintiff to the extent allowed by the Cronin rule.63 Jurics have
been instructed to consider "defect" in terms such as "reasonable expecta-
tions" or "reasonableness of putting the product on the market," 64 phrases
reminiscent of negligence principles.
C. The Law tn Colorado
Colorado court decisions during the last ten years in strict products lia-
bility cases have reflected a turmoil in the law. The basic premises for strict
liability were introduced in Bradford v. Bendi - Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake
Co.,65 where the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized section 402A as a
basis for recovery for a plaintiff injured by a product in a "defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous."6 6 Privity was held not to be a prerequisite to
recovery, and an attempt to inject an element of foreseeability into the defi-
nition of "unreasonably dangerous" was rejected by the court as a negligence
concept, inapplicable in a strict liability claim.
67
In 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court expressly adopted section 402A
in Hikgel v. General Motors Corp.6' A failure to provide an adequate warning
was held to render a product defective under section 402A, although the
product was otherwise free of defect. 69 While emphasizing that the focus
must be the condition of the product, the court held that the duty to warn
rested on considerations of the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of
consequences for failure to warn.70 The court attempted to apply strict prod-
ucts liability theory, but the requirement of determining the existence of a
duty by foreseeability and risk considerations actually kept the possibility of
recovery within traditional negligence bounds.
A comprehensive opinion by the Colorado Court of Appeals was issued
in 1976 in a strict liability action for failure to warn. In Hamilton v. Hardy,
7'
the court clarified the difference between negligence and strict liability theo-
ries. In a negligence action, a manufacturer would be subject to liability for
the article substanttlly dangerous to the user." Cavers v. Cushman Mctor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal.
App. 3d 338, 349, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 149 (1979) (emphasis in original). Although the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" requirement has been removed, the modifier indicates a weighing of de-
grees of danger. Id. See Design Defects, supra note 34, at 565.
63. Eg., Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). See Design Defects, supra note 34, at
557.
64. Destgn Defects, supra note 34, at 557.
65. 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973).
66. Id. at 107, 517 P.2d at 411.
67. Id. at 107-10, 517 P.2d at 411-13.
68. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).
69. Id. at 63, 544 P.2d at 987. The court adopted comment j to § 402A of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), which states in part: "In order to prevent the product from
being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
container, as to its use."
70. 190 Colo. at 64, 544 P.2d at 988.
71. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
19831
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injuries caused by its failure to use reasonable care to warn of possible dan-
gers. 72 In strict liability, "a manufacturer who sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused, even though the seller has exercised all possi-
ble care in the preparation and sale of the product. ' 73 Citing an Oregon
Supreme Court opinion, 74 the Colorado court emphasized that in strict lia-
bility, the issue is the condition of the product sold without warning, while in
negligence, the issue is the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in
selling the product without a warning.
75
The court of appeals concluded that the dangerousness of the product,
as distinguished from the seller's culpability, should be determined by as-
suming the seller knew of the product's propensity to injure and then asking
whether the seller acted unreasonably in selling it without a warning.
76
Such an assumption would not be made in a negligence action where the
plaintiff is required to prove the fault of the defendant. This opinion reflects
an effort to resist application of negligence principles in strict liability failure
to warn actions.
Two years later in Union Supply Co. v. AS., 7 7 the Colorado Supreme
Court expressly adopted section 402A as a theory of recovery for injuries
caused by a product unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in its de-
sign. The plaintiff was involved in an industrial accident when his arm was
caught in the "nip point" of a conveyor belt. Plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of the conveyor, alleging design defects in the conveyor and failure to
warn adequately of the dangers of working at the "nip point."'7 8 The court
confirmed its holding in Hitgel that a failure to provide adequate warning
can render a product otherwise free of defect, defective under section 402A,
and quoted Hamilton in recognizing the distinction between the focus of strict
liability and negligence actions.
79
In a footnote to the opinion, the court indicated its awareness of the
split of authority on the definition of strict liability-the followers of the
Restatement versus the jurisdictions eliminating the "unreasonably danger-
ous" requirement. 80 Although the supreme court recognized that other
72. Id. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1106.
73. Id., 549 P.2d at 1106-07.
74. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
75. 37 Colo. App. at 384, 549 P.2d at 1107.
76. Id. at 385, 549 P.2d at 1108.
77. 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).
78. Id. at 166-68, 583 P.2d at 278-80.
The absence of appropriate warnings or instructions is sometimes classified as a "design
defect." Wade, supra note 31, at 842. The court in Union Supply did not refer to absence of
warning or instruction as a design defect per se but did find that the elements in a failure to
warn case were the same as those in a design defect case, except for the need to find creation of
the defective condition due to lack of adequate warning. Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 173, 583
P.2d at 283-84. Those elements are: 1) the product is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer; 2) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change; 3) the defect must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury;
4) the defendant sold the product and is engaged in the business of selling such products; and
5) the plaintiff has been injured as a result. Id. at 171-73, 583 P.2d at 282-83.
79. Id. at 173, 583 P.2d at 283 (quoting Hamilton, 37 Colo. App. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1107).
80. Id. at 171 n.5, 583 P.2d at 282 n.5.
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courts had removed the "unreasonably dangerous" portion because of its
negligence implications, the court expressed its intention to retain that re-
quirement as a mechanism for limiting the liability of a manufacturer or
seller.
8
The court remanded the case, concluding that a jury question had been
presented on whether the failure to attach warnings had created a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff.8 2 A clear test for deter-
mining liability, however, was not defined. No mention was made of the
Hamilton provision that in strict liability for failure to warn it is assumed the
defendant knew of a product's propensity to injure.
In the 1979 case of Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co.,83 the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision which had affirmed a
verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's claims were based on breach of
express warranty and strict liability under section 402A for failure to provide
more complete maintenance instructions or for failure to warn of the conse-
quences of improper maintenance. 84 On the issue of failure to warn, the
court held that a product otherwise free of defect may be defective and un-
reasonably dangerous if not accompanied by adequate instructions and
warnings. 8 5 Such a defect, the court emphasized, may impose the same lia-
bility on a manufacturer as if the defect were a manufacturing or design
defect.
8 6
The court also held that a manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers
that may arise from improper use and handling, and that a defense of no
knowledge of prior problems is inapplicable in a strict liability action.8 7 The
argument that liability should be imposed only if the defendant knew or
should have known of a latent defect "mixes 'reasonableness' and 'foresee-
ability' concepts of negligence law with precepts of strict liability."8 8 Atten-
tion to the manufacturer's knowledge or what he could reasonably be
assumed to have known, the court continued, directs the focus away from
the condition of the product back to the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct, a result inappropriate in strict liability.8 9
The court further noted that a defendant's knowledge of a defect that
renders a product unreasonably dangerous is, in effect, assumed in strict lia-
bility cases.90 Thus, the Anderson court concluded, the jury issue was whether
the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate instructions or warning ren-
dered the product unreasonably dangerous, without regard to the reasona-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 173, 583 P.2d at 283.
83. 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979).
84. Id. at 394, 604 P.2d at 675-76.
85. Id. at 395, 604 P.2d at 676 (citing Unzon Supply, 196 Colo. at 168 n.1, 583 P.2d at 280
n.1; Hiigel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988).
86. 198 Colo. at 395, 604 P.2d at 676.
87. Id. at 397-98, 604 P.2d at 678.
88. Id. at 398, 604 P.2d at 678.
89. Id., 604 P.2d at 679.
90. Id Accord Hamtfon, 37 Colo. App. at 385, 549 P.2d at 1108. The Anderson court cited
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), the same case relied upon
in Hamiton.
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bleness of the manufacturer's conduct in failing to warn.9 1
III. KYSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORA TION V FRAZIER
In a split decision, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict
awarding damages to the plaintiff in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier.92 The
plaintiff, Jack Frazier, had filed an action against the manufacturer, Kysor,
and distributor, D.L.M., of an industrial saw seeking recovery based on strict
liability under section 402A for failure to warn or provide instructions for
the proper method of lifting and moving the saw and removing the skid.
93
The jury awarded Frazier $75,000 for injuries he suffered while moving the
saw.94 The court of appeals affirmed the decision against Kysor and
D.L.M., concluding that: 1) section 402A was an appropriate theory of re-
covery; 2) sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find a failure of adequate
instruction which created an unreasonably dangerous defective condition;
3) the plaintiff was a user or consumer within the protection of section 402A;
and 4) reversible error did not exist in the trial court's rulings on admissibil-
ity of certain evidence.
95
The supreme court majority addressed the first two issues, deciding
there was no evidence that the saw or skid was defective in the absence of a
warning. Therefore, Frazier's claim for recovery under section 402A was er-
roneously submitted to the jury. 96 The remaining issues were not addressed;
the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in
favor of Kysor and D.L.M.
97
91. 198 Colo. at 398, 604 P.2d at 679 (citing Hamilton, 37 Colo. App. at 385, 549 P.2d at
1108).
Only two other cases were reported in Colorado based on strict liability for failure to warn
or provide adequate instruction after Hitgl and prior to Kysor. In Good v. A. B. Chance, 39
Colo. App. 70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977), the court of appeals ruled that, although negligence princi-
ples are not applicable in a strict liability case, evidence demonstrating pre-existing knowledge
of inherent danger and feasibility of providing a warning should have been admitted as estab-
lishing a duty to warn users or consumers. Id. at 78-79, 565 P.2d at 223-24. This opinion
reflects some intermingling of the two causes of action.
In another court of appeals case, Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo.
App. 1981), the court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the
issue of failure to warn. The fact that persons using the equipment were aware of the defect did
not relieve the manufacturer of its duty to warn, if the duty existed at the time the equipment
was sold. Since no warnings had been given, there was a factual basis for submitting the failure
to warn question to the jury. Id. at 1290.
92. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982). Justice Erickson wrote for the majority, Justice Rovira
concurred specially, and Justices Lohr and Quinn joined Justice Dubofsky in the dissent.
93. Id. at 910.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 911.
97. Id. at 913. The third issue presented to the supreme court on appeal, whether the
plaintiff, an expert mover, was a user or consumer within the contemplation of § 402A, remains
unanswered. The majority stated that it agreed with the court of appeals that plaintiff's experi-
ence in moving heavy equipment did not preclude a finding of a defective and unreasonably
dangerous product. Id. at 911. The statement, however, appears to be dictum. In holding that
the cause was erroneously submitted to the jury under § 402A, the court concluded that it need
not address the remaining issues. Id. at 913.
The court of appeals had found Frazier to be a protected consumer under the rule that a
manufacturer who places a product into the stream of commerce must bear the risk of liability
to anyone who foreseeably may be injured along the path of delivery. Frazier v. Kysor Indus.
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In reaching its decision, the court noted that section 402A had been
adopted in the 1975 Colorado case of Hizel v. General Motors Corp.98 The
court further stated that under section 402A a product may be found defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous to the user even though faultlessly made, if
placed on the market without adequate warnings or instructions concerning
safe and proper use.99 A manufacturer's strict liability rests upon the con-
cept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of
commerce rather than on traditional negligence principles. o Nevertheless,
the court indicated that determination of the existence of a duty to warn
turns upon consideration of the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of
the consequences of failing to warn. 10 1 The focus for determining liability,
however, is to be the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the
manufacturer.10 2 In Colorado, the court noted, a plaintiff must prove that a
product is both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" to sustain an ac-
tion under section 402A.1
0 3
The court emphasized that strict liability is not the equivalent of abso-
lute liability, and therefore, the fact that an accident occurs through use of a
product does not necessarily render the product defective and unreasonably
dangerous without a warning. 10 4 According to the majority, the plaintiff in
this case was the sole cause of the accident. 10 5 There was no evidence in the
record to show the saw or skid was defective and unreasonably dangerous in
the absence of warnings or instructions; rather, Frazier created the danger by
his own mishandling.' 0 6 The court read the record as supporting a finding
that Frazier's misjudgment in failing to lower the saw to the ground and
subsequent attempt to remove the skid plate amounted to mishandling,
which was the sole cause of the danger. The plaintiff, therefore, had not
sustained his burden of proof. 107
The majority recognized that the question of whether a product is in a
Corp., 43 Colo. App. 287, 292, 607 P.2d 1296, 1301 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 642 P.2d 908
(Colo. 1982).
98. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
99. 642 P.2d at 910-11 (citing Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Hiigel v. General Motors, 190
Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965)).
100. 642 P.2d at 911.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978)). The majority
noted that some courts had eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement because of
its negligence implications, but made no further comment on the issue. 642 P.2d at 911 n.l.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 912.
106. Id. at 911-12.
107. Id. The majority relied on comment g of§ 402A of the Restatement in concluding that a
duty to warn does not exist "where a product's dangerous condition is created so/ely by the
plaintiff's own mishandling or misuse." Id. at 912 (emphasis added). Comment g provides in
part:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subse-
quent mishandling . . . [makes] it harmful. . . . The burden of proof that the prod-
uct was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller is
upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the
conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), quoted in Kysor, 642 P.2d at 911.
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"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" because of a failure to warn is
normally for the jury to decide. 10 8 Nevertheless, "after a view to all the
evidence" the supreme court concluded that the question was erroneously
submitted to the jury.10 9 The court found no evidence to show the saw or
skid was defective without a warning; on the contrary, the court found that
Frazier himself created the dangerous condition resulting in his injury." 0
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Foreseeabi/lty
It is well settled that a product may be defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous because of the absence of warnings or adequate instructions for
proper use, and that such a condition may give rise to a cause of action in
strict liability under section 402A.II' The test for determining when an un-
labeled product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, however, is not
clear. The decision is normally one for the jury. " 2 In Colorado, two differ-
ent tests have been articulated by the supreme court.
The first, applied in Higel, provides that a duty to warn must exist, and
that the duty is determined by considering the likelihood of accident and the
seriousness of consequences from a failure to warn.' 13 In Anderson a second
test was applied. The Colorado Supreme Court did not talk of a manufac-
turer's duty, but rather focused entirely on the condition of the product
without a warning." 1
4
The difference in these tests is significant. Although the fhigel court
expressed an intent to stay outside the realm of negligence and to focus on
the nature of the product, its test requires a finding of breach of a duty.
Determination of the existence of the duty requires an evaluation of what
the manufacturer could or should have foreseen. The court's focus was not
on the condition of the product, but on the conduct of the manufacturer.
The analysis was based not on the concepts associated with strict liability
but on negligence principles.
In Anderson, the court asserted that the manufacturer's knowledge of a
product's propensity for harm must be assumed in a strict liability action." 5
The reasonableness of the manufacturer's failure to warn is not to be consid-
ered.1' 6 The existence of liability is determined by considering whether the
failure to warn rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. In Ksor, the
108. 642 P.2d at 912-13 (citing Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978)).
109. Id. at 913.
110. Id.
111. See Keeton, Produt Liabiity---Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 398-99
(1970); Noel, supra note 38 at 256; Design Defects, supra note 34 at 551; Wade, supra note 31 at
830; Note, Products Liability in Texas: Foreseeability and Warnings, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1323
(1980).
112. See Anderson 198 Colo. at 398, 604 P.2d at 679 (1979); Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 173, 583
P.2d at 283.
113. 190 Colo. 57, 63, 544 P.2d 983, 987-88 (1975).





Colorado Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve this disparity by
unambiguously deciding whether a manufacturer's foreseeability is an issue
in a strict liability action for failure to warn. The majority, however, based
its decision on the conduct of the plaintiff, and the court's comments regard-
ing a test for determining liability do little but perpetuate the confusion.
Writing for the majority, Justice Erickson demonstrated the court's sup-
port for the Hi'tgel test by stating that a consideration of the likelihood of
accident and the seriousness of the consequences determines whether warn-
ings or instructions are required. i i I Justice Erickson did not, however, actu-
ally consider these factors in the opinion. He merely concluded there was no
evidence in the record showing the saw or skid to have been in a defective
condition because of lack of warning.1 18
The court stated that normal negligence rules were not applicable, but
that the manufacturer's liability was based on the theory of enterprise liabil-
ity for placing a defective product on the market.1 9 The critical issue, ac-
cording to the court, was the condition of the product without a warning.
120
Justice Erickson was careful, however, to mention that the occurrence of an
accident would not necessarily render a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous because a manufacturer is not required to be an insurer of its
products. 121
The court then asserted that Frazier's claim could not be sustained
under section 402A because it was Frazier's own contact with the saw which
caused the injury. 122 Justice Erickson rendered a holding which is confusing
on its face and likely to be interpreted inconsistently: "[W]e hold that a duty
to warn or instruct does not occur where a product's dangerous condition is
created solely by the plaintiffs own mishandling or misuse."
'123
The mention of duty brings into play the foreseeability issue. Justice
Erickson, however, did not immediately discuss the likelihood or seriousness
of potential injury, factors which he had indicated must be considered to
determine whether a duty exists. Instead he again shifted the focus to the
plaintiff's conduct. 12 4 The language of the holding quoted above may be
interpreted as meaning that a duty to warn of potential risks or to provide
instructions for safe and proper use may be determined after the harm has
occurred. This interpretation illustrates the failure in logic of the court's
holding. A duty to warn is based on foreseeability and cannot be deter-
mined by the intervening conduct of the user or on an adhoc basis. The duty
either exists or does not exist at the time the manufacturer releases the prod-
uct into the stream of commerce. It is not related to later use of the prod-






123. Id. at 911-12.
124. Immediately following the statement quoted in the text, the majority declared: "The
record establishes that Frazier created the dangerous condition which resulted in his injury by
his own inadvertence and mishandling." I. at 912.
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uct. 1 25 The court's only application of foreseeability factors was somewhat
later in the opinion where it stated that since the saw could be moved by a
variety of methods no specific warnings or instructions could have been
issued. 126
B. Patt~"nf' Conduct and the Condition of the Product
In Hiigel and Anderson the Colorado Supreme Court held that a manu-
facturer is obligated to warn of dangers that may arise from improper use
and handling.' 27 Justice Erickson did not mention that rule nor did he dis-
tinguish the facts in Kysor. Instead he cited section 402A comment g, as
pertinent to the issue of plaintiff's misuse.1 28 That comment absolves the
manufacturer of liability when the user mishandles an otherwise safe prod-
uct in such a way that it becomes harmful.' 2 9 This analysis leaves unan-
swered the question of whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
dangers that may arise from improper use and handling and the reciprocal
issue of whether a plaintiff is barred from recovery where he has misused a
product lacking instructions.
Justice Erickson was careful to note that contributory negligence, which
consists merely of failure to discover a defect in the product or to guard
against the possibility of its existence, is not applicable in a strict liability
action. 1 30 By applying comment g, the court in Kysor attempted to show that
the decision to deny recovery was reached on causation theories rather than
contributory negligence principles.' 3' According to the court, the record
supported a finding that Frazier's injury resulted from the unstable condi-
tion created by his mishandling of the forklift and saw, and not from Kysor's
failure to warn. Therefore, the issue was not contributory negligence.
132
The majority declared that the sole cause of Frazier's accident was his own
conduct. 1
33
The justifiability of the result reached by the court's application of com-
ment g must be questioned. Kysor manufactured the four-ton saw for indus-
trial use. In order for the saw to be used, it had to be moved to the buyer's
location, unloaded and placed in position-a process for which Jack Frazier
125. Trine, Duty to Warn in Product Liability Cases, 31 TRIAL TALK 7 (June 1982).
126. 642 P.2d at 912.
127. To comply with this duty [to warn] the manufacturer . . . must appropriately
label the product, giving due consideration to the likelihood of accident and the seri-
ousness of consequences. . . so. . . as to warn of any dangers that are inherent in it
and its use or that may arise from the improper handling or use of the product.
Ht'gel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988 (quoting Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App.
855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963)). "[A] manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers that may
arise from improper use and handling." Anderson, 198 Colo. at 395, 604 P.2d at 678 (citing
Hit gel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988).
128. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. "[O]rdinary contributory negligence consisting of a failure to exercise due care to dis-
cover a defect or to guard against its possible existence, is not a defense to strict liability." 642
P.2d at 912 n.3 (citing Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 174, 583 P.2d at 284). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
131. 642 P.2d at 912 n.3. See Trine, supra note 125, at 7.
132. 642 P.2d at 912 n.3.
133. Id. at 913.
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was responsible. When the saw left the manufacturer, there were no warn-
ings or instructions for moving.' 34 Comment g of the Restatement provides
that the seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition
and subsequent mishandling makes it harmful. 135 The suggestion that
someone must do something to the product, change it in some way so that it
becomes dangerous, is clear. Jack Frazier attempted to unload the saw, a
task which Kysor obviously intended. He did not transform or change it, yet
the majority denied him compensation on the basis that he created the dan-
gerous condition that caused his injuries.' 36 Even if the court intended to
overrule its prior holdings requiring warnings for foreseeable misuse, appli-
cation of comment g to the facts of Kysor seems inappropriate.
C. The Factual Dzspute
The majority emphasized that the question of whether a product was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn is
normally an issue for the jury. Yet the majority concluded there was not,
after a "view to all the evidence," sufficient factual basis for submitting the
case to the jury. 137 The dissenting opinion written by Justice Dubofsky and
joined by Justices Lohr and Quinn suggests that there was sufficient conflict-
ing evidence to take the matter to the jury, and that the jury's determina-
tions should not have been disturbed unless so clearly erroneous as to find no
support in the record.
138
Evidence which could have aided the jury in reaching its finding that
without a warning the saw was in an unreasonably dangerous defective con-
dition included: 1) sheet metal covered the saw's surface above its center of
gravity, making the appearance of stability deceiving; 139 2) the only method
used by Kysor to move the saw around its plant was by overhead crane with
chains attached at certain lift points;14° 3) Kysor also used the crane to load
the saw onto a truck for shipment; 14 i and 4) even if the plaintiff had lowered
the saw and skid to the floor before attempting to remove the skid, the skid
could not have been removed without lifting the saw alone, and the saw
alone could not have been lifted in a stable manner with the forklift.
142
Information presented to the supreme court indicated the feasibility of
attaching a label to the saw with instructions and warnings for moving and
unloading. Kysor had consistently used a hydrocrane to move the saw
around the plant and to load the saw for shipment; the lifting points were
always the same and could have been marked. 143 A clear warning label
concerning operation was already being attached to each saw in a minimal
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965). See supra note 107.
136. 642 P.2d at 912.
137. d. at 912-13.
138. Id. at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (quoting Peterson v. Ground Water Comm'n, 195
Colo. 508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978)).
139. 642 P.2d at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
143. Respondent's Brief at 4, Kysor.
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amount of time.' 4 4 Yet the majority in Kysor concluded that "no specific
warnings or instructions regarding the lifting or moving could logically have
been given."'
145
The dissent focused on facts surrounding the condition of the saw. 146
The majority based its finding on the conduct of the plaintiff.147 Regardless
of the basis for the decision, Colorado law requires that appellate courts be
bound by the jury's findings: where there is evidence in the record to sup-
port the result, where the decision is based on conflicting evidence, and
where the jury has been correctly instructed by the trial court. 148 A reading
of the majority and minority opinions reveals factual issues which a jury
should have been allowed to decide. The evidence reported in the minority
opinion refutes the majority's repeated assertions that the plaintiff was solely
responsible for the accident. 1
49
CONCLUSION
The decision to deny the plaintiff recovery in Ksor v. Frazier is notewor-
thy for several reasons but probably not for the reasons that initially come to
mind. This decision has broken a Colorado trend of plaintiff recoveries in
strict liability for failure to warn cases. The majority reached its conclusion
in apparent disregard of key evidence, and in so doing, overturned a jury
finding which according to precedent should not have been disturbed.
The court seemed to hold that a plaintiffs misuse affects a manufac-
turer's duty to provide adequate warnings or instructions, thus barring re-
covery in a strict liability action. The court interpreted the record as
supporting a finding that Frazier was the sole cause of the accident, yet the
opinion was filled with a confusing discussion of negligence and strict liabil-
ity principles. If, as the majority held, Frazier alone was responsible and it
was not the absence of adequate warning or instruction which resulted in his
injuries, then nothing was to be gained by commenting on the manufac-
turer's duty to warn or the condition of the product without a warning. By
discussing the negligence concepts of foreseeability and degree of injury (tests
for determining a duty to warn), but also asserting that strict liability for
failure to warn is an action based on the condition of the product, the major-
ity has perpetuated confusion of the two actions. This result is particularly
ironic since the discussion was unnecessary under the majority's own inter-
pretation of the evidence.
It is unfortunate that the Colorado Supreme Court, in its discussion of
144. Id.
145. 642 P.2d at 912.
146. Id. at 913-14 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
147. 642 P.2d at 911-12.
148. Id. at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (quoting Vigil v. Pine, 176 Colo. 384, 490 P.2d 934
(1971)). Sealso Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 198 Colo. 28, 595 P.2d 1048 (1979); Page v. Clark, 197
Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979).
149. "[W]e can find no evidence in the record showing that . . . the saw and attached skid
were in a defective condition because of a lack of warning .. " 642 P.2d at 911. "The record
establishes that Frazier created the dangerous condition which resulted in his injury by his own
inadvertence and mishandling. . . . [T]he accident happened solely because Frazier created an
unstable condition .. " Id. at 912.
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strict liability, failed to clarify a test for determining liability for failure to
warn cases. Negligence analysis focusing on a seller's duty will continue to
be confused with purer strict liability analysis focusing on the condition of
the product, and the possibility exists that a plaintiff's misuse will be success-
fully asserted as a bar to recovery.
juh" E Lapin

